



Chapter 9

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Chapter 9 | The CDR gap

A gap exists between national pledges for CDR and scenarios that meet the Paris temperature goal.

Key insights

- The CDR gap is 0.3 GtCO₂ in 2030, 1.2 GtCO₂ in 2035 and 5.2 GtCO₂ in 2050.
- The CDR gap is based on the difference between levels of CDR in national pledges and in scenarios that limit the end-of-century global temperature rise to 1.5°C with highest ambition.
- Current national CDR pledges sum to 2.5 GtCO₂ in 2030, 2.7 GtCO₂ in 2035 and 3.6 GtCO₂ in 2050. The latest NDCs submitted in 2025 did not substantively increase ambition.
- Highest Ambition scenarios have median CDR levels of 2.9 GtCO₂ in 2030, 3.9 GtCO₂ in 2035 and 8.8 GtCO₂ in 2050.
- If countries do not take ambitious action to reduce emissions, more CDR will be required to hold warming to 1.5°C, increasing the CDR gap in the long-term.
- Major uncertainties associated with evaluating the CDR gap remain, including ambiguities in the amount of CDR pledged by countries, the credibility of those pledges and how quickly global emissions will peak. Credibility concerns with current CDR pledges mean the CDR gap may be larger than what we assess here.

Rapid reductions in emissions from fossil fuels, land-use change and agriculture are fundamental to meeting climate goals in the coming decades. CDR will also play a key role, yet current national CDR pledges fall short of pathways consistent with 1.5°C warming; this difference is known as the “CDR gap”. The most impactful development regarding the CDR gap in this version of the report (compared to *The State of CDR 2nd Edition*) is the United States’ decision to leave the Paris Agreement. Disregarding the United States’ net-zero target increases the gap by approximately 700 MtCO₂ in 2050. Otherwise, the latest round of NDCs has not delivered a step change in ambition. Urgent action is required to close the CDR gap. Without meaningful steps to reduce emissions in the next decade, the CDR gap will increase even further by 2050.

9.1 The CDR gap concept

The CDR gap is a measure of the difference between the sum of national CDR pledges and the amount of CDR in scenarios that meet the Paris temperature goal.

To calculate the CDR gap, this report estimates the amount of CDR pledged by parties to the Paris Agreement (see Chapter 5). This analysis primarily draws on the NDCs (for pledges in 2030 and 2035), and the LT-LEDs (for pledges in 2050 and beyond) that are submitted by parties to the UNFCCC. Pledges for these three years – 2030, 2035 and 2050 – are then compared with levels of CDR in model scenarios that meet the Paris temperature goal. These scenarios are referred to as Paris-consistent scenarios, as they limit warming to below 1.5°C by the end of the 21st century (see Chapter 8).

The quantification of the CDR gap serves two functions: it highlights the amount of CDR required to reach the Paris temperature goal, and it facilitates the tracking of progress towards this goal. This allows an understanding of three broad issues: the extent to which national CDR pledges are sufficient or ambitious; whether those national pledges are achievable and, if so, at what cost; and the degree to which mitigation strategies are overly reliant on CDR at the expense of pursuing deep emissions reductions.

Key considerations when calculating and interpreting the CDR gap

Quantifying the CDR gap involves comparing national pledges against a chosen set of model scenarios that serve as benchmarks. The choice of scenarios is a normative one, as they rely on different rates of CDR scaling to balance gross emissions reductions and reach net-zero emissions. For a given temperature goal, scenarios that implement less mitigation action through reductions in GHG emissions in the near term tend to increase their dependency on CDR in the long term.^{1,2} In other words, one could benchmark CDR pledges against scenarios in which ambitious mitigation is delayed, but CDR must subsequently be scaled to very high levels. In this case, the CDR gap would become larger. Conversely,

one could choose to benchmark pledges against scenarios with more ambitious near-term emissions reductions but lower levels of CDR. In this case, the CDR gap would be smaller.

Our choice in this analysis is to quantify the lower bound of what the CDR gap could be. We compare the sum of parties' most ambitious CDR pledges against a set of Highest Ambition scenarios that assume immediate, ambitious action at all levels to reduce emissions (see Chapter 8). These scenarios comprehensively phase out fossil fuels and cut deforestation rates to zero while also incorporating significant efforts to reduce final energy demand through efficiency and sufficiency measures. This scenario design reduces the dependency on CDR to meet the 1.5°C temperature limit. However, because the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C is nearly exhausted,³ scenarios assume a degree of temperature overshoot. This means that net negative emissions will be required to return to 1.5°C towards the end of the 21st century. We interpret these scenarios as representing our current understanding of the lower bound of CDR required to meet the Paris temperature goal. It should be acknowledged, however, that this level may change. On one hand, the gap could decrease as new scenarios and literature become available. Very low energy demand or “degrowth” scenarios, for example, could involve more ambitious emissions reductions and thus achieve lower levels of CDR. Such scenarios have been published in the past but are currently out of date with respect to recent emissions trends.⁴ On the other hand, the gap could increase as scenarios are updated to reflect recent trends of emissions growth.^{5,6}

Box 9.1 Key terms


The CDR gap: measures the difference between the sum of national CDR pledges and the amount of CDR in scenarios that meet the Paris temperature goal. The gap is calculated in two benchmark years: 2030 and 2050.

NDCs: include pledges submitted by parties to the Paris Agreement detailing their climate targets and actions in the near term. NDCs submitted in 2025 contain targets for 2035, while prior NDCs have focused on 2030. As parties have by now submitted multiple NDCs, we refer to specific NDCs by their sequence (e.g. China's 2nd NDC or Brazil's 3rd NDC).

LT-LEDSS: are plans submitted by parties to the Paris Agreement detailing their long-term climate targets and actions, often describing mid-century (e.g. 2050) net-zero pledges.

National CDR pledges: outline pledged removals by parties to the Paris Agreement in 2030, 2035 and 2050, as estimated from their NDCs and LT-LEDSSs. Note that parties do not pledge CDR directly, but rather net emissions reductions and/or enhanced removals and sinks. Several assumptions need to be made to estimate national CDR pledges, as described in Chapter 5. For 2030 and 2035, the NDCs of G20 countries as well as other major countries where land sinks play a key role are assessed. For all other parties, CDR is assumed to say the same.

The CDR gap concept



a) In model scenarios that reach the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, a combination of ambitious immediate emissions reductions and a CDR scale-up are required to reduce net CO₂ emissions.

b) The CDR gap measures the difference between CDR pledged by parties, estimated from their climate targets and plans versus CDR in scenarios that assume highest possible ambition in reducing emissions. The gap is measured annually in 2030 and 2035 (against the NDCs) or in 2050 (against the LT-LEDs).

c) If countries delay ambitious mitigation action, scenarios show that more CDR will be required to meet any given temperature goal. The CDR gap is, therefore, conditional on parties also delivering emissions reductions and will increase if they fail to do so.

- Emissions: fossil CO₂ and GHG emissions
- Emissions: managed land
- CDR (novel and conventional)

Figure 9.1 Illustration of the CDR gap concept showing (a) CDR in model scenarios, (b) the gap between pledged CDR and CDR in scenarios, and (c) the direction of change with more CDR in scenarios with Delayed Ambition.

An implicit feature of the CDR gap is that countries also need to undertake emissions reductions in line with the Highest Ambition scenarios. Otherwise, the CDR requirements in the future will increase. We illustrate this by calculating how the long-term commitment to CDR increases if countries delay ambitious emissions reductions by ten years but still aim to preserve the 1.5°C temperature goal. These findings correspond to the “Delayed Ambition” scenarios outlined in this report (see Chapter 8).

The CDR gap is measured annually for years where pledged CDR values are available: 2030 and 2035 using the NDCs and 2050 using the LT-LEDSSs. Despite this, it is the cumulative emissions and removals that matter for the temperature response of the climate system. In other words, what matters is the total amount of CO₂ emitted to and removed from the atmosphere during the 21st century, not the annual amount in 2030 or 2050. This is an important limitation of the analysis.

Our approach to quantifying the CDR gap in *The State of CDR 3rd Edition* differs from the 1st and 2nd Editions. In *The State of CDR 2nd Edition*, we compared national pledges against three “focus scenarios” that held warming to 1.5°C but used differing amounts of CDR.^{7,8} Here, we aim to simplify the CDR gap analysis by presenting single benchmark numbers in 2030, 2035 and 2050. As in other assessments,⁶ we also aim to shift towards comparing pledges against compiled scenario ranges, rather than individual scenarios that quickly become outdated relative to current trends in emissions and removals.

There are other important normative and sustainability issues to consider when evaluating the CDR gap. When appropriately implemented, certain CDR methods may come with co-benefits.⁹ However, there is increasing evidence that scaling up CDR to very high levels would likely bring negative environmental, social and other sustainability impacts.¹⁰ The scenarios used here and assessed in Chapter 8 are vetted based on their emissions trajectories. Modelling teams were asked to consider and implement sustainability limits in their model designs, for example taking account of total bioenergy use, water use and food prices. But deployment at such levels may nonetheless involve trade-offs and conflicts. Of course, any delay in ambitious mitigation action will increase the need to scaling up CDR to high levels, raising the risk that deployments will drive conflicts and inequities, for example in relation to land, energy or material resources. This, again, emphasizes the importance of rapid, ambitious reductions in near-term emissions to reduce the future dependency on CDR. Above all, the CDR gap analysis should not be interpreted as downplaying the need to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, agriculture or deforestation. At this stage, meeting the Paris Agreement climate goals requires maximal effort in all forms of climate change mitigation, whether reducing emissions or increasing removals.

Finally, it should be noted that the CDR gap considers two distinct categories of removals: conventional CDR and novel CDR (see Chapter 1). Conventional CDR refers to removals achieved through afforestation, reforestation and forest management, as well as other

enhancements to the land sink via management of soils and vegetation (e.g. soil carbon sequestration in croplands and grasslands and agroforestry). A considerable amount of conventional CDR already occurs (2.2 GtCO₂ per year on average between 2014 and 2023) as informed by bookkeeping models, which align with values derived from NGHGs (see Chapter 7 and its Technical Annex). The majority of pledged CDR in NDCs and LT-LEDs is related to conventional CDR (see Chapter 5).

Novel CDR refers to methods such as DACCS, BECCS and biochar, which are in an early stage of development. Very little novel CDR takes place today, with current estimates of about 0.002 GtCO₂ per year in 2025 (see Chapter 7). Novel CDR is less well represented in pledges, but it is widely incorporated into scenarios – with considerable scale-up in the second half of the 21st century (see Chapter 8). We do not disaggregate pledges or scenarios into the different types of CDR here, but it should be noted that they do involve different policy challenges and other trade-offs, as discussed in other chapters of this report.

9.2 The size of the CDR gap

A significant gap remains between national CDR pledges and levels of CDR in Highest Ambition scenarios with immediate emissions reductions. National pledges are estimated to deliver 2.5 GtCO₂ per year of removals in 2030, which is the sum of current levels of CDR (2.2 GtCO₂ per year, see Chapter 7) and estimated changes in CDR from current levels to 2030 (+0.3 GtCO₂, see Chapter 5). The median level of CDR in the chosen scenarios reaches 2.9 GtCO₂ per year in 2030. This leaves a CDR gap of at least 0.3 GtCO₂ (see Figure 9.2).

The CDR gap




Figure 9.2 The CDR gap in 2030, 2035 and 2050. Removals are shown here as positive numbers. CDR in national pledges refers to the most ambitious set of pledges. Least ambitious pledges – which are, for example, conditional on financing in NDCs or are from lower-bound net-zero scenarios in the LT-LEDs – sum to 2.4 GtCO₂ in 2030, 2.5 GtCO₂ in 2035 and 3.3 GtCO₂ in 2050. (Note that the 2030 gap numbers do not sum perfectly due to rounding.)

Looking ahead, the CDR gap widens to 1.2 GtCO₂ by 2035 and 5.2 GtCO₂ by 2050. These estimates are based on the most ambitious levels of CDR pledged in parties' NDCs (2.7 GtCO₂ in 2035) and LT-LEDs (3.6 GtCO₂ in 2050), versus those in the median of scenarios with highest ambition (3.9 GtCO₂ and 8.8 GtCO₂, respectively).

The size of the CDR gap is contingent on the depth of emissions reductions that are undertaken over the coming decades. In the Highest Ambition scenarios, gross emissions are reduced by 38% in 2035 compared to levels in 2025 (see Chapter 8). In other words, global emissions have peaked, and countries are well under way to decarbonizing their energy systems, phasing out fossil fuels and halting deforestation within the next ten years. This is not the current trend in either the emissions or emission reduction pledges – both of which remain far off track for limiting warming to 1.5°C. Indeed, the CDR pledges evaluated here represent the upper bound of parties' ambitions. Benchmarking against the least ambitious CDR pledges would see the CDR gap grow by several hundred megatonnes in 2050.

A delay in ambitious emissions reductions will have long-run consequences with Delayed Ambition scenarios having to remove over 150 GtCO₂ more from the atmosphere by 2100 compared to the Highest Ambition scenarios. This means more effort to scale up and sustain CDR over a period of decades in the second half of the 21st century (see Table 9.1). It also means an increased reliance on novel CDR, as the potential for conventional CDR is ultimately limited by land availability. Finally, delayed emissions reductions will lead to global average temperatures exceeding 1.5°C for longer, during which time humans and ecosystems will be exposed to severe climate impacts, potentially leading to risks of reversals in land sinks, among other issues.

Consequences of delayed ambitious emissions reductions on the CDR gap

	Highest Ambition scenarios	Delayed Ambition scenarios
Cumulative CDR, 2023–2100	841 GtCO ₂	1005 GtCO ₂
Cumulative conventional CDR, 2023–2100	405 GtCO ₂	398 GtCO ₂
Cumulative novel CDR, 2023–2100	380 GtCO ₂	577 GtCO ₂
Years exceeding 1.5°C	55 years	68 years

Table 9.1 Note: Median values for each category are shown.

The CDR gap has changed in several ways since *The State of CDR 2nd Edition* was published. In terms of national CDR pledges, the most significant change has been the formal exit of the United States from the Paris Agreement in January 2026, 12 months after the start of the Trump administration. While climate action might still continue at a subnational level in the United States, the country's withdrawal from both the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC has triggered a significant downward revision in total national CDR pledges of approximately 700 MtCO₂ in 2050, as we assume that the US net-zero pledge with its associated removals is no longer valid. The overall effect of the United States's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has been evaluated as adding up to 1 GtCO₂e of net emissions to current policy projections in 2030, making it a very significant factor in recent climate target and pledge assessments.⁶

Other changes to our assessment of national pledges incorporate updates relating to both methodology and historical data – not to changes in ambition levels. Since publication of *The State of CDR 2nd Edition*, none of the NDC updates from the G20 group and other large countries have included significant increases in CDR pledges,¹¹ and only a handful of countries have submitted new LT-LEDs. An important methodological update for the long-term strategy (2050) estimates was to harmonize our approach with the NDC methodology: these are now calculated simply as the difference between future pledges compared to the 2014–2023 average. In previous editions we attempted to discount “indirect effects”, but we no longer do so because of inherent and large uncertainties in national scale modelling of terrestrial carbon fluxes. (For a full documentation of the NDC estimates and methodology, see the Chapter 5 Technical Annex.)

9.3 Uncertainties

The precise size of the gap between CDR pledges and Paris-consistent scenarios depends, in particular, on three factors: the persistent ambiguities in national CDR pledges, credibility concerns with current pledges and uncertainties in model scenarios.

Persistent ambiguities in national CDR pledges

Identifying and calculating CDR pledges from the NDCs and LT-LEDs is not a straightforward task due to major ambiguities in how targets and pledges are formulated and described. In general, governments provide insufficient clarity on how their historical and future committed fluxes disaggregate between additional sinks (CDR) and reduced emissions. This makes it difficult to assess both current levels of CDR activity and each government's plans for CDR.^{12,13} Underlying reasons for these difficulties include an absence of mandatory requirements to disaggregate sectoral contributions to targets and pledges, issues around accuracy and consistency of reported fluxes,¹⁴ and limited institutional capacity in developing countries.¹⁵ Accuracy and consistency are particularly

consequential for estimates of conventional CDR – which stem from pledged changes to removals in the LULUCF sector. Emissions and removals in this sector have the highest uncertainties of all GHG fluxes, and major revisions to historical data occur regularly because of new observations and modelling results.¹⁶

Recent developments in UNFCCC reporting, including the introduction of BTRs and updated NDCs submitted since *The State of CDR 2nd Edition*, have not reduced these ambiguities.¹¹ These are likely to continue and will remain a source of uncertainty for estimating the CDR gap.

As an example, the updated NDC submitted by Indonesia in 2025 provides sectoral emissions pathways that indicate how it might achieve its mitigation targets.¹⁷ However, the historical net emissions estimate underlying the pathway for LULUCF (reported as “forestry and other land use”) deviates significantly from the latest inventory data (reported as “land use, land use change and forestry”) submitted less than a year prior in Indonesia’s first BTR; the NDC land-use pathway starts at a historical emissions level of 221 MtCO_{2e} in 2019, while the inventory data (CRT tables) estimates this as 819 MtCO_{2e}. The NDC notes that it uses estimates from the BTR for other sectors, but more recent data for the land-use sector. Observers, therefore, face the challenge of deciding which baseline to use for estimating future pledges, while carrying the risk that future revisions may further change the assessment.

Even among UNFCCC Annex I countries, which have long been requested to submit annual GHG inventories and have made significant investments in the measurement and tracking of land-use emissions and removals, we face issues of interpretation. For example, Japan and Canada use accounting approaches for describing their action in the LULUCF sector that renders interpretation difficult.

Credibility concerns with the implementation of national CDR pledges

When moving from policies to implementation, it is important to note that CDR methods are, or will be, implemented in existing, diverse economic sectors including energy, oil and gas, mining, forestry and agriculture. They may be facilitated by ETSs, other policy frameworks, or VCMs, with carbon removal priorities balanced against other competing societal objectives such as biodiversity protection and food production. Ensuring country-appropriate portfolios of CDR methods that are implemented and scaled up requires more than target setting alone. Countries can demonstrate credibility through actions including: establishing net-zero pledges in law; implementing CDR policies and measures; and comprehensively planning for scaling CDR. Chapter 5 includes a credibility assessment for G20 countries that reveals only a handful have transparent and credible pathways for scaling CDR.

Credibility issues with national pledges may mean that the CDR gap is actually larger than what we assess here. Most pledges for 2030 and even 2050 depend on conventional CDR to provide a majority of the removals. The LULUCF sector is highly dynamic and vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural influences, rendering it challenging both to quantify and to disaggregate anthropogenic from natural emissions and removals.^{18,19} For example, Europe has a LULUCF target of 310 MtCO₂e net removals in 2030 (53 MtCO₂e more than the 2014–2023 average). Recent assessments of Europe's forest carbon sink, however, suggests that its ability to remove carbon is declining due to increasing climate impacts (e.g. pests, disease, drought and wildfires) and anthropogenic pressures (e.g. increased harvesting).^{18,20,21} These types of climate change impacts are poorly captured in global Earth system models, contributing to uncertainties in the viability of future land carbon sinks.

Policymakers must account for the impacts of climate change and other human-induced pressures on LULUCF. If forests and soils are to contribute to reaching net zero, there is an urgent need to not only protect and maintain current land carbon sinks but also to limit warming as much as possible through rapid emissions cuts.^{18,22,23}

Model uncertainties

One of the main sources of uncertainty in evidence from scenarios is whether they are too outdated to be accurate, especially in comparison to recent historical emissions. In previous editions of this report, the benchmarked scenarios had already been surpassed by the time of publication. Scenarios had, for example, already peaked in global emissions by 2020 and were en route to significant emissions reductions by 2030 that were far outside the range of pledges and current policy projections. As a result, Lamb et al.^{7,8} applied an ex post adjustment to the scenario pathways to indicate the additional mitigation effort required to compensate for actual historical emissions. In this edition we make use of a new compilation of Highest Ambition scenarios that is far more up to date relative to historical emissions. In these scenarios, emissions follow the historical trend and do not peak before 2024 (see Chapter 8). An adjustment is therefore not applied, but it may become necessary again in future versions, depending on the state of the scenario literature and progress in net emissions reductions.

Finally, recent literature suggests that if the risk of a stronger-than-average response of the climate system to anthropogenic GHGs is factored in, governments would need to deploy several hundred gigatonnes of additional CDR in the 21st century, and/or lower their residual GHG emissions even further.^{29,32} A precautionary approach therefore calls for interpreting emissions reductions and CDR levels in scenarios as the lower bound of what may be needed to safely stabilize global temperatures.

9.4 Outlook

A gap is evident between the latest national CDR pledges and scenarios consistent with the Paris temperature goal. As it stands, countries are not planning for the levels of CDR scale-up needed to compensate for historic emissions and reverse the global temperature overshoot in the second half of the 21st century. The latest round of NDCs, delivered in 2025, does not show increased ambition in terms of pledged CDR, nor have there been major developments with new net-zero pledges or LT-LEDs. In fact, the exit of the United States from the Paris Agreement dramatically worsens the assessment for 2050. Parties need to pledge hundreds of megatonnes more CDR in 2030, over a gigatonne more in 2035, and over five gigatonnes more in 2050 to get on track for meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goals. Different approaches have been suggested for how parties can increase their ambition levels (see Box 9.2).

Box 9.2: Increasing national ambitions to close the CDR gap

Closing the CDR gap and meeting the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement requires higher collective ambition, which, in turn, means higher ambition for individual parties. While parties are mandated under the Paris Agreement to prepare and submit national mitigation targets as part of their NDCs, the treaty leaves each nation to determine for itself what a feasible and fair contribution would be. NDCs are required to meet certain standards, including that each NDC represents a progression on previous targets and reflects the parties' "highest possible ambition", meaning that governments should perform their due diligence in assessing possible mitigation options, including for CDR.^{24,25} But there is no requirement that parties explicitly quantify the anticipated role of CDR in their targets and pledges, despite a broad consensus within the scientific community that such information is important for evaluating ambition and progress.^{26,27}

How we judge the appropriate ambition levels for parties is inevitably a normative question, but one that has been explored by academia and civil society initiatives. In the first instance, there have been calls for parties to state transparently how CDR will contribute to their targets and pledges, limit their reliance on CDR by accelerating emissions cuts, and institute credible plans to rapidly scale up CDR.^{22,28-30} Few parties have met these conditions (see Chapter 5).

Recent work has explored how parties' ambitions for scaling CDR could be informed by different "fair share" principles.³¹⁻³⁵ For example, if future CDR needs were allocated according to historical emissions or "carbon debt", the European Union, the United States and other industrialized countries would need to deploy a much larger share of global CDR than in pathways designed to minimize global costs.^{31,33} Generally, this literature supports the notion that more developed OECD countries should be frontrunners in scaling global CDR.

The longer near-term emissions cuts are delayed, the greater the future CDR burden becomes. The sheer scale of CDR needs – even if emissions are drastically curtailed – means that what would constitute a globally equitable share of CDR deployment for many countries might not be feasible for them domestically. Financial transfers between states offer one way to reconcile the inevitable trade-offs that arise when considering what the “highest possible ambition” would be. This comes with its own challenges, such as how to ensure that CDR deployment across borders does not reproduce historical inequities in decision-making power, benefit-sharing and accountability, and that carbon flows are transparently tracked along international value chains.^{36,37}

Beyond national governments, state-owned and private companies could also be considered responsible for removing CO₂. Climate justice scholars have considered how compensation from highly polluting companies could be used to fund the scale-up of expensive mitigation options like CDR.³⁸ For example, Kellou et al.³⁹ show how large, investor-owned fossil fuel companies could be considered responsible for investing in DACCS to accelerate cost reductions.

If 1.5°C is to be kept alive as a goal, some parties will need to go beyond net-zero pledges and remove more than they emit – also known as “net negative emissions” (at least in terms of CO₂, but potentially overall GHG emissions). But while a few parties have declared such intentions, none have taken steps to declare or specify net negative pledges. Establishing these and reframing national net-zero pledges as a transitional phase, not an end point, would be an important way to signal ambition in line with the Paris Agreement – particularly for those governments that could be considered to bear more responsibility.⁴⁰

To meet their obligations and close the CDR gap, governments need to undertake an ambitious programme of planning for and delivering CDR in the coming decades. This will take time and care if we are to ensure that CDR scaling is robust, fair and durable. It is, therefore, important to start now⁴¹ and to consider a diverse range of CDR methods to avoid over-reliance on any single approach and balance social and environmental sustainability with issues such as durability and feasibility.^{23,42}

The remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C will likely be exhausted by 2030.⁵ As we move closer to a world exceeding 1.5°C, governments still are not responding with ambitious and credible pledges to scale CDR. Reducing fossil fuel, agriculture and deforestation emissions remains a fundamental priority and precondition for stabilizing warming to avoid serious and lasting climate impacts. The next challenge, however, cannot be ignored: to ensure that we are on track for delivering on CDR at the scale needed throughout the 21st century.

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